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“Questions such as ‘Who do you think you 
are’, ‘Where do you come from?’, ‘Where are you 
going?’ These are totally useless questions […] all 
imply a false conception of voyage and movement”  
[Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 25] 
 
“The modern world is one of simulacra. Man did not survive God, 
nor did the identity of the subject survive that of substance. All 
identities are only simulated, produced as an optical 'effect' by the 
more profound game of difference and repetition.” 
[Deleuze, 1995, p. 15] 
 
“To write is to become. Not to become a writer, but 
to become, intransitively”  









Beckett’s dramatic oeuvre has been popularly connected to the existential anguish and 
metaphysical despair traversing Continental philosophy in the second post-war era. The 
present paper intends to approach the Beckettian cosmology presented in Waiting for 
Godot from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s schizoanalysis and political ontology of 
the Body without Organs, so as to examine the desire’s potentiality contained in the 
(absent) figure of Godot. By focusing on the deterritorializations that Godot’s desiring-
machine produces, Beckettian characters will be explored as inscriptions of the post-
structuralist field of nomadic subjectivity. This will enable a productive reading of 
Beckettian realm of ‘nothingness’, not anymore as epitome of crisis, but as suggestion of 
a new plane of immanence from which to re-organise subjectivity.   
Keywords: Beckett, Waiting for Godot, Schizoanalysis, Nomadic subjectivity  
 
Resum 
L’obra dramàtica beckettiana ha estat popularment associada a l’angoixa existencial i 
metafísica que travessà la filosofía continental de la segona post-guerra. El present estudi 
s’apropa a la cosmologia presentada a Waiting for Godot des de l’esquizoanàlisi i 
l’ontologia política del cos sense òrgans de Gilles Deleuze i Félix Guattari, a fi 
d’examinar la potencialitat del desig contingut en la figura (absent) de Godot. A partir de 
l’anàlisi de les desterritorialitzations desencadenades per la màquina desitjant que Godot 
representa, s’exploraran els personatges beckettians com a inscripcions de la teoria post-
estructuralista de la subjectivitat nomàdica. Aquest enfocament permetrà una lectura 
productiva del “no-res beckettià”, entès ja no com a epítom de crisi sinó com a proposta 
d’un nou pla d’immanència de (re-)organització de subjectivitat.  
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In Beckett and poststructuralism (1999), Anthony Uhlmann points at the irreducible 
multivocality of Beckett’s criticism, and states that any interpretation of his work should 
address a particular aspect or facet in order to make him justice: “as a friend you are 
forced to recognize the impossibility of absolute possession” (p. 2. In narrowing down 
the critical endeavour to the particularity of “which Beckett?”, the openness of his work 
is maintained and thoroughly rendered productive. Only by acknowledging the numerous 
disciplinary knots involved in signifying Beckett’s work will this dissertation be able to 
attain its specific location within the critical field and become what is set out to be: a full 
molecular irruption into the Oedipal, molar discursive-machineries that approach 
Beckett’s Waiting for Godot as the epitome of the crisis of Western metaphysics’. This 
paper contests the aesthetics of postmodernism that have read Beckett’s work as the end-
date of metaphysical, modernist postulates (see Nealon, 1988), as well as the apocalyptic 
existentialist anguish which has celebrated Beckettian drama as the confirmation of 
human absurdity and Wittgensteinian silence (see Esslin, 1964). Therefore, the work that 
follows does not attempt to reduce Waiting for Godot to a self-explanatory transparent 
surface, but to establish a critical dialogue, a relation of dis-identification with the play’s 
alterity in order to do justice to its infinity – that is: its irreducible difference. Structurally 
organised as a discursive assemblage operating in several critical strata, the paper hereby 
establishes multiple dialogues with the contemporary philosophical debate on the limits 
of humanness and the capitalistic production of subjectivity, as well as with the role of 
staged performance, as Laura Cull puts it, in shaping the ontology of becoming (2009, 
p.7). Theatre’s bodies are not mediators embedded in broader systems of representation, 
but are subjected to the actualization of performance, and therefore “always differentiated 
in their own way of becoming” (Cull, 2009, p. 5) Deleuzoguattarian fluid ontology is 
crucial for the understanding of performance as an immanent becoming, for it points at 
the theatrical event’s univocity of being. 1   
Throughout the process of delimiting the object of study, several discussion lines 
have been discarded for the sake of the paper’s adherence to the format-limitations and 
its internal coherence. Although suggested in the paper’s orientation towards body 
politics and the genealogy of disciplinary discourses, the power-relation governing Pozzo 
                                                          
1 Univocity is defined in Deleuze’s philosophy of difference as the quality of “being univocal”, or “being 




and Lucky will not be critically explored. Lucky’s speech might be seen as pointing to 
the crisis of phallogocentrism and the consequent unfolding of critical devices tackling 
the White-male-rational-standard-speaking-subject; Pozzo’s necropolitics – as Paul B. 
Preciado would put it – might open Waiting for Godot to Giorgio Agamben’s notion of 
zoe as the human body’s capacity to be reduced to non-human states by the intervention 
of sovereign power, and thus engage with a radical revision of the very notion of life. The 
whole investigation around the performative limits of the human body and its becoming-
animal would be an interesting terrain to cover in a future dissertation, for Beckett’s anti-
representational theatre and his anti-humanist ‘characters’ nominalization has been linked 
to the animalization of the human body proposed by the “Theatre of Revulsion” (see 
Baudrillard, 1988), or to Agamben’s notion of bare life – developed in his Homo Sacer 
(1995). Exploring Lucky’s becoming-animal and masochist relation to Pozzo’s 
necropolitical force, as I have suggested formerly, would draw Waiting for Godot into the 
contemporary performance practices of butoh, and thus a whole different theoretical 
framework would need to be implemented, – mainly: post-humanist political fictions, 
cyberpunk post-feminism, and the Italian materialist critical theory (Agamben, Rosi 
Braidotti and Antonio Negri).  
Consequently, I have narrowed down the qualitative question of “which Beckett” 
to a post-structuralist reading of the ‘characters’ in Waiting for Godot. In order to draw a 
critical cartography of the dissertation’s body, it might be useful to specify the different 
levels on which it operates. Firstly, at a macro-level, the paper engages with what Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari theorise as “philosophy of difference” (1972) in order to re-
think the processes of subjectivation whereby Beckettian characters in Waiting for Godot 
are produced. The Deleuzian philosophy of difference foregrounds an affirmative thought 
that acknowledges multiplicity over linear, traditional noology. The notion of difference 
is ontologically opposed as that of identity or representation – the principle constituting 
the entire system of Western metaphysics. As Deleuze points out in Difference and 
Repetition, representation has been the form of mediation which reduces the multiplicity 
and heterogeneity of differences to oppositional, analogical relations. Braidotti (1994) 
argues that difference as disparagement has been the backbone of a philosophical tradition 
which defines the subject in terms of sameness and equates subjectivity with 
consciousness – cotigo, ergo sum – implying an asymmetrical dialectic tension between 




the subject’s sameness. It is therefore inevitable to re-inscribe the potentiality of 
difference’s formulaic expression (…x + z + y …) into the ontological system that 
interests me: Deleuze and Guattari’s development of an immanent, molecular, and 
intensive ontology – the Body without Organs.  
Secondly, at (a) micro-level(s), a dialogue is established with the critical inquiries 
pursued by Deleuze and Guattari themselves in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1972) and its second part A Thousand Plateaus (1987) to understand 
desire-production as a libidinal economy articulating the socius of the Vladimir-Estragon-
Godot’s society.2 As side-effects of the desiring-machine, Vladimir and Estragon arise as 
dismembered, molecular bodies assembled to the broader, molar machine that Godot 
represents. If in Anti-Oedipus the deconstruction of subjectivity is expressed in terms of 
schizophrenia and desiring-production, in A Thousand Plateaus the notion of subjectivity 
is replaced by the plane of immanence or the body without organs.  
Finally, the affective relationships drawn in the text will be explored to see 
whether Godot’s operates as a molar, fascist institution – thus rendering the Real a bare, 
asymbolic desert, and the waiting unproductive– or whether it does in fact set in motion 
a series of deferrals that, along with a deconstructive reading, might suggest a new virtual 
plane for Beckett’s Waiting for Godot to arise as a political fiction of nomadic 
subjectivity. This work is aimed, therefore, at exploring the ways in which Godot’s 
functioning as a “desiring-machine” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2009) may propel a radical 
re-organisation of the “full-bodied”3 character’s immanence, and thus propose a de-
centred, deterritorialized ontology of the subject.  
In consistency with the purposes of schizoanalysis, the present paper attempts not 
to reduce Waiting for Godot to a univocal critical constellation, but to unfold the text’s 
immanent polyvocality:  
Reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in search of what is signified […] 
rather it is a productive use of the literary machine, a montage of desiring 
                                                          
2 Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘socius’ the transcendental principles which subtend the constitution of the 
social order.  
3 I am specifying the bodily materiality of the ‘character’ because Beckett’s have been normally embodied 
by actors. It has not been until recently that the body has become central to performance and thus radically 
dismembered, dehumanized and freed from its “organicity”, radically re-organized in multiple becoming-





machines, a schizoid exercise that extracts from the text its revolutionary 
force (Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 106)  
2. TO SCHIZOPHRENIZE THE UNCONSCIOUS: DESIRING-MACHINES AS 
SOCIAL-MACHINES 
The term “desiring-machine”, as Guattari explains, refers to the idea that desire is 
a machinic process invested in economic and social production:  
Desire corresponds to a certain kind of production, and it is definitely not 
something undifferentiated. Desire is not an organic drive, or something that 
is operated by the second law of thermodynamics, dragged along inexorably 
by some kind of death drive. On the contrary, desire has infinite possibilities 
of assembly” (2007, p. 354)  
In conceiving the machinic nature of desire, desiring-production becomes a process of 
constant assembling and re-assembling with infinite semiotic creativity. To understand 
desiring-production as a machine immanent to flows of capital and the socio-economic 
structuring of life, it is necessary to account for the critique that Deleuze and Guattari 
address to psychoanalysis’ Oedipal complex and the production of the unconscious as the 
factory of a molar-oedipalized subjectivity – which Beckett sets out to contest. Similar to 
the way Deleuze and Guattari theorize the production of subjectivity as side-effect of the 
connection between a machinic assemblage of enunciation and social machines elsewhere 
that presuppose it, desiring-machines are theorized in Anti-Oedipus as inextricable from 
social machines: “desiring-machines don’t exist outside the social machines that they 
form on a larger scale; and no social machines without the desiring-machines that inhabit 
them on a small scale” (2004a, p. 340).  
Desire, conceived of as production, solely the production of fantasies, is 
articulated by psychoanalytic theory as a fundamental, ontological lack, “related to an 
extrinsic natural or social production […]  but producing an imaginary object that 
functions as a double of reality” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 25), and thus linked to a 
world external to reality itself: the imaginary realm.  By setting the unconscious and the 
Oedipal-holy family as central vectors of desire-production, psychoanalysis 
“personologised, imaginarised, structuralised” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 55) its 
productive and social force, and consequently incarcerated into an economy of 




complex and henceforward repeated in morbid forms. The Ur-castration which enables 
the subject’s entering the symbolic realm underpins a libidinal economy founded on a 
formal fissure, an ontological unviability. In contrast to the psychoanalytic move of 
tracing every desire’s symptomatic deviation back to the “family romance” or the oedipal-
triangle “mommy-daddy-me”, Deleuze states in Difference and Repetition: “I do not 
repeat because I repress; I repress because I repeat” (1968, p. 20). He thus first 
foregrounds the schizo-entity that he will later put forward in Anti-Oedipus: a molecular 
being stripped off the Oedipal-complex and freed from the molar discourses that produce 
its subjectivity in terms of being and sameness. 
Freud presented three processes whereby desire was codified and individualized: 
first, the revolutionary element whereby desiring-production was discovered; second, the 
cultural element which reduced everything to Oedipal theatrical representation (the return 
to myth); and the third element, “a formidable enterprise of absorption of surplus value” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 118). These syntheses territorialized desire in the domain 
of the unconscious imaginary and segregated it from social production. Deleuzoguattarian 
desiring-machines, however, are concerned with the real production of affective 
connections and flows of intensity: “The real is not impossible; on the contrary, within 
the real everything is possible, everything becomes possible. Desire does not express a 
molar lack within the subject; rather, the molar organization deprives desire of its 
objective being” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 27). Desire is, in this way, not to be 
found in its oedipal repression within the nuclear family – the Oedipal complex – but 
rather present everywhere in the form of productive processes connected with everything 
else: in the very socius of the capitalist-machine. Desire-production and social-machines 
are phenomenologically connected: desire’s products, effects, intensities, produce reality. 
Desiring-production arises, then, as a machine immanent to flows of capital and the socio-
economic structuring of our lives: “only fantasies are truly desired? What a perverse, 
human, all-too-human idea!” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 295). Thereby, a new radical 
politics of desire arises as foundational of the schizo-subject, opposing the neurotic 
prototype theorised in Freudian psychoanalysis. The operativity of the schizo-flows is to 
be found in their “deterritorialization of flows of desire in the molecular elements of 
desiring-production” (p. 314). Only through escaping the familial-Oedipal-machine as 




and thus read Beckettian ‘characters’ as schizo-entities escaping the neurotic-couch of 
psychoanalysis.  
2.1.De-coded flows: escaping the neurotic-couch.  
Following the machinic indices of deterritorialization, the first negative task of 
schizoanalysis must be that of de-oedipalization and de-castration. If desire is found to be 
operating outside the Law-of-the-father, outside the Nation-State binary, and outside any 
transcendental, molar belief, the schizo-subject is that which, in his/her nomad, orphan, 
and atheist position, can effectively overcome the tyranny of the Oedipal configuration 
and its ideological implications. Namely, the ideological link between psychoanalysis and 
capitalism as “the mechanism for the absorption of surplus value” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2009, p. 313). It is fundamental to understand Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of the 
social-machine as working alongside the oedipalizing-machine of psychoanalysis. They 
argue that, through the development of industrial society and the establishment of the 
capitalist system, the potentiality of desire has been invested in producing the socius and 
its molar aggregate(s): the capitalist-machine and the holy family. The task of 
schizoanalysis is that of discovering “the entire interplay of the desiring-machines and 
the repression of desire” (pp. 381-382), and to find desire’s molecular lines of escape. 
The economy of desire they present in Anti-Oedipus has as ultimate aim the production 
of a deterritorialized subject:  
Desiring-production is first and foremost social in nature. The body without 
organs is not an original primordial entity that later projects itself into 
different sorts of socius […] on the contrary: the body without organs is the 
ultimate residuum of a deterritorialized socius (2009, p. 33)  
Family is the delegated agency of oedipalization: it represses desire while 
simultaneously ensuring the reproduction of society’s economic system. It is not that 
desire is Oedipal: on the contrary, it is the social repression of desire – the statis of 
libidinal energy (p. 118) – that incarcerates desire into society’s oedipal organization. The 
schizo-subject is a threat to familial harmony; a semiotic perversion consequent upon a 
process of breakdown and disintegration: “the more the process of production is led off 





2.2.Schizoanalysis: the positive task  
The positive task of schizoanalysis is, as stated in Anti-Oedipus, to find “the 
functioning of his [sic] desiring-machines” (2009, p. 322), that is, the subject’s desiring-
machines. The mechanism of schizoanalysis is activated by identifying the technical 
machines involved in desiring-production. In fact, the starting point for desiring-machines 
is the process of dispersion – of deterritorialization – defined in the previous subsection. 
The deviant schizo-subject must find its molecular elements, its particular objects. The 
molecular, singular elements of the desiring-machines are found in mutual independence 
and thus are not interdependent, but fully disparate. Deterritorialization produces a series 
of “schizoid sequences” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 324) which, far from acquiring 
coherence as interwoven elements, acquire full potentiality in their singularisation and 
dispersal. Such is the case in Beckett’s Waiting for Godot when Estragon’s shoe unleashes 
the ‘character’s’ corporeality as a machinic assemblage of haecceities: 
ESTRAGON, sitting on a low mound, is trying to take off his boot. He pulls 
at it with both hands, panting. He gives up, exhausted, rests, tries again. As 
before. 
Enter Vladimir.  
ESTRAGON: [Giving up again.] Nothing to be done. (1952/2010, p. 5) 
 
Estragon’s inability to tie his shoelaces would seem to suggest a disabled, 
dysfunctional organism which has lost its wholeness in irreversible fragmentation. 
Instead of jumping into absurdist assumptions, however, I would rather suggest that a 
whole new paradigm of the body is at work. Constituted in their molecularization, the 
organs of the body no longer respond to the functions dictated by an organic organism: 
they have freed themselves from the molar organization that conceives them as partial 
objects of a “totality to come” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 324). As Deleuze states 
“dispersion has nothing to do with a lack, and constitutes their [the organs’] mode of 
presence in the multiplicity they form without unification or totalization” (2009, p. 324), 
and thus Estragon’s schizo-entity is conformed in a dislodged ontological structure. 
Estragon’s exhaustion, as Audroné Žukauskaitė has pointed out, suggests that all 
potentialities coexist in the virtual plane of immanence, where: “nothing is excluded, and 
nothing is preferred” (2015, p. 72). The synthesis whereby Vladimir and Estragon become 




2.3.On our way to the Body without Organs  
As specified by Deleuze and Guattari (2009), the process of becoming-
imperceptible follows three different syntheses: the first one is called the connective 
synthesis of production; the second one is the disjunctive synthesis of recording; the last 
one is the conjunction synthesis of consumption-consummation, which will ultimately 
produce the full body without organs.  
The BwO is first produced in the passive synthesis of connection. In contrast to 
either/or binary oppositions, the connective synthesis of production displays an open 
formula – similar to the differential one that I have mentioned in the introduction – which 
contains a multiplicity of combinations and permutations: “either… or… or”. Hereby, 
differences are assembled as heterogeneous and do not cease to be differences. Deleuze 
and Guattari’s example is the molarity of our heterosexuality – produced by the socius as 
a molar aggregate– which coexists alongside the molecularity of our transsexuality or of 
our homosexuality. In contrast with psychoanalytical interpretation of the syntheses of 
the unconscious as resulting in the psychoanalytic Oedipal subject, the connective 
synthesis stands for the coupling of desiring-machines into an anoedipal flux. 
Žukauskaitė clarifies the obscure description provided by Deleuze and Guattari in the 
following way: “all these connections construct and create desiring-machines which, in 
their turn, increase the level of affectivity and desiring-production” (2015, p. 67) 
The second synthesis – the disjunctive synthesis of recording – follows the 
schizophrenic deviant move away from the Oedipal triangle and “affirms the disjoined 
terms […] without restricting one by the other or excluding the other from the one” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 76) An instantiation of this procedure is illustrated by 
Estragon’s schizo-shoe or the rope whereby Lucky becomes the masochistic actualization 
of power, and thus a molecular haecceity4 aggregated to Pozzo’s machinic assemblage of 
power:  
POZZO: [With magnanimous gesture.] Let’s say no more about it. [He jerks 
the rope.] Up pig!” [Pause.] Every time he drops he falls asleep. [Jerks the 
rope.] Up hog! [Noise of LUCKY getting up and picking up his baggage. 
                                                          
4 Deleuze and Guattari coin the term ‘haecceity’ to refer to a desubjectified mode of individuation: “A 
season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date [...] They are haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely 
of relations of moviment and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and to be affected” 




POZZO jerks the rope.] Back!” [Enter LUCKY backwards.] Stop! [LUCKY 
stops.] Turn! [LUCKY turns.] (Beckett, 1952/2010, p. 20) 
This is the stage that disconnects one affective machine from another. This 
disconnection is not exclusive but inclusive, because all the affective machines coexist 
together. This disjunctive synthesis keeps Beckettian characters and events together: this 
is the plane of immanence where “everything divides, but into itself” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2009, p. 76). The disjunctive synthesis differs from Hegelian synthesis, for 
instead of abolishing disjunctions, they persist and coexist on the same plane of 
immanence. The disjunction is also non-restrictive in that it can freely go across 
traditionally limited ‘bodies’ or individuals. In this light, Lucky and Pozzo would be 
viewed no longer as persons, but as “singularities flocking from all sides, evanescent 
agents of production” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 77), conforming a transpositional 
subject – which will be ultimately dissolved in A Thousand Plateaus, as I will discuss 
later on.  
After the state of disjunctive synthesis there is the conjunctive synthesis of 
consumption-consummation, which reconnects the disjoined elements into the intensive 
flow of becoming and desiring-production. This is the stage where a new nomadic subject 
is created, not as a transcendent cause of the desiring-production, but as “an effect, a side-
product” (Žukauskaitė, 2005, p. 65) In short, the conjunctive synthesis produces the 
nomadic subject and pure intensities: “the nomadic and polyvocal” (Deleuze and Guattari 
2009, p. 105) qualities of the conjunction synthesis can circulate on the plane of the Body 
without Organs. In their recapitulation of the three syntheses, Deleuze and Guattari argue 
that the Nitzschean announcement of the father’s death always manifests the need for a 
belief, for a structure: “a belief by virtue of nonbelief” (2009, p. 107). According to this, 
the present schizo-reading of Beckett’s Waiting for Godot refuses to condemn Beckett’s 
staging of indeterminacy as a bare desert of ‘nothingness’ or an ultimate mourning for the 
loss of grand-narratives. Instead, a productive reading of desire’s anoedipal iterations is 
put forward. Engaging with Guattari’s micropolitics of desire, Vladimir and Estragon will 
not be viewed as homogeneous subjects in relation to an individual bodily unit, but as 
“subjective-objective assemblages of heterogeneous components” (2007, pp. 369-370) 
that, having escaped the ‘neurotic couch’ of oedipalization – that is, the investment of 
desire’s unconscious in the production of the social field – and having freed themselves 




a higher social and cultural production” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 74) have entered 
the virtual field of the plane of immanence.  
3. THE BODY WITHOUT ORGANS AND THE PLANE OF IMMANENCE 
If in Anti-Oedipus subjectivity is deconstructed through schizophrenizing the 
unconscious and de-oedipalizing desire, in A Thousand Plateaus the deterritorialized 
subject of Capitalism and Schizophrenia is dissolved into the Body without Organs. The 
plane of immanence – the plateau where all becomings and transformations take place – 
is a plane of intensive connections and reconnections, a machinic complex of intensities 
and flows of desire. As “every BwO is itself a plateau in communication with other 
plateaus on the plane of consistency” (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, p. 183), the Body 
without Organs is in contact with its oppositional plane: the plane of organization – or the 
plane of transcendence – which subjects it to the molar strata of the organism, 
signification and subjectification. I find this notion particularly productive in relation to 
Beckett’s presentation of dis-embodied ‘characters’, for instead of viewing them as 
dysfunctional or de-naturalized, mutilated beings, it makes it possible to conceive them 
as producers of a new political ontology: one that is constituted by flows of intensities, 
by displacement, by a constant reassembling of planes of intensity.  
In the plane of consistency desire is not defined by exterior transcendent causes: 
“desire no longer lacks anything but fills itself and constructs its own field of immanence” 
(2013, p. 181). This field of immanence disturbs the dichotomy between inside and 
outside, external, inner, or nonself: the unconsumable body without organs allows all 
intensities to pass through, it is the “surface for the recording of the entire process of 
production of desire” (2009, p. 11). It is no longer an ontology of dasein but a fluid 
ontology of becoming: 
Instead of speaking of a subject, a subject of enunciation, or of Freud’s 
psychic agencies, I prefer to speak of a ‘collective assemblage of 
enunciation’. A collective assemblage does not correspond either to an 
individuated entity or to a predetermined social entity. Subjectivity is 
produced by assemblages of enunciation (Guattari, 2007, p. 43).  
Subjectivity is, thus, re-considered as an ensemble of collective instances produced by 
the arrangement of processes of individuation. An example of this machinic process 




language and words which, at the same time, presupposes a social machine that selects 
and uses them – connective synthesis. Once the whole is defined by the parts which 
independently belong to it, the disjunctive synthesis takes place and the molecular 
aggregates – the components of the machine – are divided in a non-exclusive, 
amalgamating disjunction. At last, the desiring-machines are reconnected to other 
desiring-machines and allow intensities to pass freely through them, constituting the plane 
of immanence of the body without organs, where no distinctions between natural and 
artificial, nor inside and outside are made (Deleuze and Guattari, 2013, p. 311).  
3.1.Nomadology 
Deleuze and Guattari articulate nomadic identity as a dynamism or ambition 
against the collective body of the State. They qualify of State-noology the monopolization 
of organs of power, the sending out local representatives, and the way the State “gives 
thought a form of interiority” and endows it with a universalizing tendency (2013, pp. 
430-437). The nomad wields war against the State’s pouvoir and sovereignity: “the 
imperium of true thinking” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2013, p. 436), and its classical image 
of thought: myth and logos – the foundation of true thinking and its legislative and 
juridical organization. Nomadic thought, they argue, rides difference and exteriority 
instead of interiority and identification. In this, the notion of speed, as defined by Deleuze: 
“a body whose irreducible parts occupy or fill a smooth space in the manner of a vortex, 
with the possibility of springing up at any time” (2013, p. 473) becomes productive for 
thinking the nomad’s in-between, dynamic locatedness. The nomad’s life is defined by 
its never-ending trajectory in the intermezzo: “the nomadic trajectory distributes people 
(or animals) in an open space, one that is indefinite and noncommunicating” (2013, p. 
443). Opposed to the migrant, which pursues an ultimate reterritorialization, the nomad 
is the “Deterritorialized par excellence” (p. 444), precisely because he does not seek 
anchoring nor identification. Rosi Braidotti develops Deleuze and Guattari’s “War 
Machine” – their denomination for nomadology – further as a writing practice, a political 
ontology, and an aesthetics (see Braidotti 1994), and similarly to Deleuze’s intermezzo, 
she puts emphasis on the nomad’s “radical nonbelonging and outsidedness” (1994, p. 16). 
Braidotti’s polyglot draws from Deleuzoguattarian nomadism in that it poses being in 
between languages as crucial for the deconstruction of the illusion of a unitary, self-




The necessity of not having control over language, of being a foreigner in 
one’s own tongue, in order to draw speech to oneself and bring something 
incomprehensible into the world (Deleuze and Guattari, 2013, p. 440)  
In this respect, the distressing estrangement effect on Waiting for Godot’s non-
sense mumbling would support the idea of a subject which has become defamiliarized 
with the same language-systems that produce it, suggesting, perhaps, a “parodic” refusal 
of the State-apparatuses’ discourses on molar – or oedipal – subjectivity. What really is 
at stake in Waiting for Godot’s “absurdity” is not just a “defamiliarization technique” – 
as Aston and Savona suggest (1991) – but a resistance to micro-fascism’s scattered 
hegemonies, that is: the resistance to a State organization of thought whereby the subject 
is an internalization of a universal truth. In his preface to Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, Michel Foucault argues that Deleuze and Guattari’s collective work is a 
critical endeavour against fascist systems. By this he means not just Hitler’s or 
Mussolini’s state fascism, “but also the fascism that is in us all, in our heads […] that 
causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (2009, 
p. xiii). In this regard, Deleuze and Guattari’s aim is clear: they are not the new Hegel, 
nor do they offer a new all-encompassing theory that can supposedly sustain thought in 
its various manifestations. Instead, they put forward a theoretical machinery that helps us 
to de-stabilize and constantly de-centre the power-structures that both reside within and 
produce us. Anti-Oedipus is a modus operandi – in Foucault’s words: “the first book of 
ethics written in France in quite a long time” (p. xiii.), a theoretical tool of de-
individualization that seeks to reassemble us in a collective, anti-Oedipal, non-fascist 
subject: “Anti-Oedipus is the introduction to the non-fascist life” (p. xiii).  
3.2.Micropolitics: the molar and the molecular  
Regarding the State-noology described in the former section, what I attempt to 
introduce hereby is the contingency of two coexisting planes, the molar and the molecular, 
whereby the Deleuzian schizo-entity or nomadic subject is constituted as a de-centred 
entity. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze states that “every society, and every individual, 
are plied by both segmentarities simultaneously: one molar, the other molecular” 
(emphasis on the original, 2013, p. 249), thus emphasizing that both domains are 
inextricably linked. The configuration of the Deleuzoguattarian political ontology is 
directed, firstly, at dismantling the molar institutions from which we are always afraid to 




is what gives us a “well-defined status” (2013, p. 265) and a codification into the social 
machines. In my introduction I gave an outline of the dialectics between the molar and 
the molecular by posing Godot as a conflation of the two. Its physical absence deems 
Vladimir and Estragon’s existence a violent mourning for an apparent pre-ontic meaning 
– and thus acquires a mythological state – but, at the same time, it establishes a series of 
“lines of flight, which are molecular” (2013, p. 252), namely: Vladimir and Estragon’s 
re-organization in a virtual plane of becoming. It seems, therefore, evident that the 
Vladimir-Estragon-Godot society points at an ultimate collapse and involution of the 
‘characters’ corporeality.  
The difference is not at all between the social and the individual (or 
interindividual), but between the molar realm of representations, individual 
or collective, and the molecular realm of beliefs and desires in which the 
distinction between the social and the individual loses all meaning” (2013, p. 
256) 
Along these lines, then, Godot foregrounds the tension between the molar and the 
molecular in so far as it is a two-fold structure: both a symbolic, mythical element, and a 
machinic, real element of desiring-production. Deleuze’s conceptualization of what 
Foucault calls “micro-fascisms” – that is, our desire for the same power that exploits us 
– is briefly exposed in A Thousand Plateaus as microtextures: “microtextures – and not 
masochism – are what explain how the oppressed can take an active role in oppression” 
(2013, p. 263). To instantiate the process whereby molar, fascist institutions engender 
their own noology in individuals, Guattari provides a practical example:  
Everything that is produced by capitalistic subjectivation – everything that 
comes to us through language, the family, and the facilities around us – is not 
just a question of ideas or of transmission of meanings by way of signifying 
statements […] It has to do with systems of direct connection between the 
great machines of production – of social control – and the psychic agencies 
that define the way of perceiving the world (2007, p. 37)  
The collective assemblage Vladimir-Estragon shows evident proof of not fitting into the 
Godot-molar regime: they have become sceptical of his arrival and their waiting has 
become consequently pure intransitive becoming, for there is no transcendental cause 




Deterritorialized beings per excellence, or as Deleuze calls it: “as war machines, 
following other models, another dynamism, a nomadic ambition, over against the State” 
(2013, p. 426).  
ESTRAGON: Oh yes, let’s go far away from here.  
VLADIMIR: We can’t.  
ESTRAGON: Why not?  
VLADIMIR: We have to come back tomorrow.  
ESTRAGON: What for?  
VLADIMIR: To wait for Godot.  
ESTRAGON: Ah! [Silence.] He didn’t come?  
VLADIMIR: No.  
ESTRAGON: And now it’s too late.  
VLADIMIR: Yes, now it’s night.  
ESTRAGON: And if we dropped him? [Pause.] If we dropped him? (Beckett, 
1952/2010, p. 90)  
The line of escape suggested in this passage recalls the Foucauldian movement towards 
vagabondage which, as described in Discipline and Punish (1995), refers to a process 
instigated on the molecular level which consequently involves a turning towards a world 
of real existence. In a Deleuzoguattarian threshold, this deviant, nomadic move against 
State power would be fined as a “revolutionary tendency on the molecular plane” 
(Uhlmann, 1999, p. 68) What follows is a movement towards becoming-imperceptible: 
the plane on which the body without organs acquires full potentiality.  
3.3.Becoming-imperceptible  
Žukauskaitė defines the process of becoming-imperceptible as a “means to 
disorganize the body, to dismantle the system of signification, and to renounce the subject 
and subjectivity” (2015, p. 9). As described formerly, the molecularization of the Self to 
which Žukauskaitė refers to implies an escaping the over-codification of the State-
noology. Once the prison of the Oedipal-subject has been dismantled, what follows is an 
opening of the body’s cartography to a series of speeds and affects that uproot the organs 
from the hierarchization assigned to them by the molar idea of the organism. As Todd 
May suggests, all becomings – animal, molecular, imperceptible – are affirmations of the 




non-ground of specific identities’ (May in Cull, 2009, p. 7). At such a point of de-
codification, the Body without Organs follows a “creative involution” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2013, p. 278) that is: a heterogeneous form of evolution, which radically re-
organizes it as an intensive spatium through which all intensities can pass. The BwO is 
“the matrix of intensity = 0” (2013, p. 178) that is no longer in need of an arborescent 
structure to sustain it. The renunciation to a transcendental cause – Godot as myth – re-
establishes desire no longer as lacking something, but “filling itself and constructing its 
own field of immanence” (2013, p. 181).  
Becoming-imperceptible should not be interpreted as self-annihilation but as a 
movement towards a de-subjectivized and non-organic immanent force. It is no longer 
about the body’s organization but of its intensive composition; according to its 
movements and speeds, it will affect in more or less intensity other machinic assemblages. 
In this plane is where their affect theory is developed: Deleuze and Guattari equate 
Spinoza’s “capacity” to latitude – a term borrowed from physics –, conceived of as “the 
affects of which the body is capable at a given degree of power” (2013, p. 299). Whereas 
latitude is the total sum of the intensive affects the body is capable of at a given degree, 
longitude refers to its movements of speed and slowness. It is by these two parameters 
that Deleuze and Guattari articulate a body-cartography of becoming.   
Becoming-imperceptible is the last synthesis whereby the molar subject is 
dissolved, it is the “immanent end of becoming, its cosmic formula” (2013, p. 325). 
Composed of haecceities, flows of intensities and assemblages, the body without organs 
allows affects to pass freely and constitute it. The subject becomes, consequently, re-
configured in what Guattari calls a “collective assemblage of enunciation” (2007, p. 43), 
encompassing not just individuals or persons but also haecceities – a kind of mode of 
individuation different from that of a person, a subject or a thing –, which set in motion a 
series of relations of movement and rest (longitude and latitude). The process of 
individuation of a subject involves, in the plane of the body without organs, a set of 
“nonsubjectified affects”, which Deleuze and Guattari call ethology: the science that 
studies what a body can do, what its affects are (2013, pp. 300-306). It involves the 
intersection(s) of certain degrees, certain intensities or haecceities; the schizo-subject 
becomes a proliferation of n-becomings, of multiple assemblages. The notion of the Body 
Without Organs becomes highly productive when theorizing the machinic assemblages 




performance and its multiple actualizations proliferate in ever-new desiring-machines: 
the irreducibility of the performance’s n-becomings is what I will try to develop in the 
next section.  
4. BECKETTIAN INDETERMANENCE IN WAITING FOR GODOT 
It is remarkable that Beckett sets up an undelimited, undetermined space of 
performativity for the ‘characters’ to evolve. The very fact that there is no symbolic 
reference to a recognizable, mappable reality brings about Ihab Hassan’s notion of 
indetermanence, this one being the conjunction of ‘immanence’ and ‘indeterminacy’ – 
namely: “decreation, disintegration, decenterment, de-totalization […]” (1987, p. 217). 
In such indeterminacy – even of iterability – is where the full-potentiality of immanence 
can operate. “A country road. A tree. Evening” (Beckett, 1952/2010, p. 5) gives rise to 
unsettling setting with no permanent, central reference point from which to articulate 
reality. In a non-place where all possibilities coexist in potentiality without any structure 
or plan, we are dealing with the plane of immanence, where all “disjunctions subsist […] 
but the disjoined terms are affirmed in their nondecomposable distance” (Deleuze, 1998, 
p. 153). Conceiving Beckettian ‘characters’ as becomings does not just re-shape the 
cartesian, molar notion of the subject, but re-shapes all the chain of signifiers tied to it: 
the language-machine, the social-machine, in short, all molar strata constructing the 
subject. In doing so, the collapse of the signifying system – or, in other words, its 
unproductive state – moves from the conjunctures of space and time – which are basic to 
our notion of humanity – to broader social bodies: language and the articulation of 
subjectivity. If we understand language not only as a semiotic machine but also as a 
component of a broader social machine that produces bodies, the corporeal 
dismemberment is just the effect of a larger collapse.  
ESTRAGON: And all that was yesterday, you say?  
VLADIMIR: Yes, of course it was yesterday.  
ESTRAGON: And here where we are now?  
VLADIMIR: Where else do you think? Do you not recognize the place?  
ESTRAGON: [Suddenly furious.] Recognize! What is there to recognize? All 
my lousy life I’ve crawled about in the mud! And you talk to me about 





The fact that external recognition is unfeasible for generating knowledge points at 
the dissolution of their molar subjectivity, at the schizophrenization of the traditional 
phenomenological body, namely: the complete deterritorialization of the ‘characters’ 
ontology. The real is considered as that which differs from itself rather than as any self-
same presence that is doomed to be distorted in mimetic activity of representation. Laura 
Cull holds onto this idea by comparing the becoming of the theatrical body with Deleuze’s 
clothed repetition – the differential power of repetition –, and deeming the performance 
act a full Body without Organs in itself: “theatre’s bodies are not just mediated by the 
embedded systems of representation, but always differentiated in their own way of 
becoming” (2012, p. 7). In these lines, life – the scenario – appears as essentially 
connected to its longitude and latitude: its extension through space and time. Estragon’s 
burlesque statement points, meta-reflexively, at the individual/collective third body of the 
stage’s intercorporeal field and breaks immediately with the illusive notion that theatre 
articulates a mimetic representation of reality. Becoming has acquired primacy over 
representation. Beckettian ‘tragedy’ is not to be thought as an acknowledgement of life’s 
lack of meaning, but as the affirmation of life’s impossibility of transcending its 
contingency and self-creative power. 
4.1.Full bodies without organs: Vladimir and Estragon’s virtuality  
Analysing the implications suggested by punctuation in Deleuze’s article: 
“Immanence: A life…”, Giorgio Agamben points at the virtual domain contained in the 
ellipsis dots. In his lines, the indefinition – or indeterminacy – of the punctuation suggests 
the “transcendental determinability of immanence as singular life, its absolutely virtual 
nature and its definition through this virtuality alone” (1999, p. 224). The potentiality of 
the incompleteness accomplished by this “atactic” (p. 222) articulation, he argues, does 
not refer to a lack or a suspension in meaning, but rather a radical transformation of the 
notion of ‘life’ itself, from which the ellipsis dots become inextricable. Incompleteness, 
indefinition and indeterminacy acquire a reality on their own: the determination of 
immanence, or the full virtuality of Deleuze’s plane of immanence. In regards to this, it 
is remarkable to quote Deleuze’s statement on the implications of the indeterminate 
pronoun “a”, whereby “children use it not as something indeterminate but, on the 
contrary, as an individuating function within a collectivity” (2013, p. 308). By this he 




individuation –, affects and molecular intensities, and foregrounds the potentiality of 
immanence.  
Laura Cull has argued that Deleuze’s immanence is not a call to the dissolution or 
disintegration of the body, but rather a call for “participation, multiplication and extension 
of the human body” (2012, p. 7). In these lines, the Deleuzoguattarian ontological 
framework articulates Beckettian characters as fluctuant bodies without organs, traversed 
by a tendency towards becoming-imperceptible that raises the question of life as a non-
organic power. It is in their dismemberment, in their de-humanization that the desiring-
machines arise as productive mechanisms of meaning-production: “the genesis of the 
desiring-machine lies in the opposition of the process of production of the desiring-
machines and the non-productive stasis of the Body without Organs” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2009, p. 8)  
POZZO: I don’t seem to be able … [Long hesitation.]… to depart. 
 ESTRAGON: Such is life. (Beckett, 1952/2010, p.44) 
Removed from a recognisable place, Beckettian ‘characters’ emerge as schizophrenic 
entities; they acquire a near-catatonic status as reminders that there is no original 
primordial entity called ‘organism’ or ‘individuum’, but what has been defined as the 
immanency of becoming: “there is only a process that produces the one within the other 
and couples the machines together” (Deleuze, 2009, p. 9).  
Vladimir and Estragon’s de-humanization is translated to an organic 
dismemberment of the body. The very notion of humanity is put on the ropes by the 
mechanism of stripping off basic defining coordinates – such as time and space, which 
are continually reversed – in order to expose the ‘real’ substratum of their existence: a 
tendency towards becoming-imperceptible. Whether Beckett exposes a humanitarian 
crisis or presents a new constellation of thought is not as relevant as the way in which he 
analyses human condition as an assembly of desires and fluctuations.   
Subjectivation is part of a gear assembly of affects circulating through 
deterritorialized bodies – desiring-machines that produce one another and progress, 
circularly, in its own continued re-definition. As Deleuze puts it: “the subject is born of 
each state in the series, it is continually reborn of the following state that determines him 
at a given moment, consuming-consummating all these states that cause him to be born 




McKellen as the lead duo of Vladimir and Estragon in Broadway – affirmed that the more 
you embrace all the contrasts and the less you try to link them in a logical linearity, the 
better you understand the diverse nature of the play (McKellen, 2013).   
The play rejects the plane of organization of traditional theatrical teleology, 
conceiving the fabula/sujet parameters of Aristotelian drama as cornerstone of theatre, in 
a way that Brian Richardson puts as the following: “in many of Beckett’s plays, the 
characters’ speeches and disclosures are so oblique, fragmented, contradictory, or 
unreliable that a single consistent story cannot be exhumed” (2007, p. 59). Waiting for 
Godot survives in the margins of textuality, it lives by the questions it arises, by the 
referential voids it produces: it unfolds through its ever-new becoming(s) in the form of 
haecceities. Waiting for Godot’s potentiality of differential becoming(s) is linked by 
Žukauskaitė to Deleuze’s notion of ‘time-image’ – the equivalent of the plane of 
immanence in Deleuze’s film theory –, that is, a plane consisting of “simultaneously 
virtual and actual, composed of different and multiplied time dimensions” (Žukauskaitė, 
2015, p. 73). This would harmonize all possible interpretations of the play to its univocity 
of being – a differential, processual, immanent “oneness” of life. The multiple becomings 
of Waiting for Godot are best seen in its vast staged performances, for it is in the practice 
of mis-en-scène that the text’s meanings are crystallized in materiality:  
“the staging creates yet another additional dimension of dissemination, 
dispersing and cancelling textual significance in a field of heterogeneous 
materials, structures and processes which in turn create new and largely 
unpredictable meanings” (Lehmann, 2007, p. 37).  
Susan Sontag talks about the direct impact the play had in Sarajevo during the 
siege by the Serbian forces in 1993; how Haris Pašović – a Sarajevan theatre and film 
director – convinced her to direct Waiting for Godot, for it “seemed written for, and about, 
Sarajevo” (1994, p. 88). Similarly, Jan Jönson – who staged Waiting for Godot at San 
Quentin’s prison in 1985 – states that the inmates’ “standing behind the bars, just listening 
to silence” (Reilly, 1987) makes them really understand the language of the play. All 
layers of Waiting for Godot’s performative virtuality coexist and conform the play’s own 
Body without Organs. It is just in conceiving it as a semiotic continuum transformed in 




What aligns this paper as a deconstructive insight into Waiting for Godot is 
outlined by a discourse that runs against systematic or intended sense, and especially 
against a reified authorial intention. Deconstruction and Deleuzian machinic 
assemblages, reveal the infinitely subtle ways by which the play’s complexity is 
characterised: a constant deferring of ultimate, transcendental meaning. In this sense, 
Waiting for Godot inscribes itself into what Martin Midekke and Christopher Henke have 
specified as postmodern aesthetics of drama: 
A fascination for self-reflexive, metadramatic modes which reflect upon 
epistemological uncertainty, ambiguity, and blanks; a mistrust of totality 
which results in fragmented formal structures: collages, cut-up forms, 
paradox, pastiche, parody -signifiers that disperse unidirectional attributions 
of fixed meanings, intentions, or propositions (p. 13). 
In this Beckettian non-place, bodies are disjointed not just from transcendental 
meaning – or molar aggregates –, but also from their own organicity. The social machine 
is now incredulous of ‘metanarratives’ and thus conscious of its immanent and contingent 
condition. Meaning is not already there, être là, but rather fabricated through processes 
of ‘différance’ and repetition. It is the aim of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis to set 
up a new ontology for a displaced lodging of referentiality and substance. Thought 
becomes an element of exteriority that does not lodge itself in an ordered interiority, nor 
reposes on identity, but that contemplates and rides difference.  
4.2.Godot as a desiring-machine  
Waiting for Godot’s experimental staging has been qualified as an expression of 
post-war existential anguish (see Herbert Blau, 1987), as an obsessively repetitive play 
on human’s absurdity (see Esslin, 1989), even a “estrangement” device of the linguistic 
sign-system (see Aston and Savona, 1991). However, Beckett’s refusals to establish any 
kind of determining interpretation points at his rejection of “dominant significations and 
orders of subjection”, as well as his preference for “incorporeal transformations and 
corporeal disarticulations” (Žukauskaitė, pp. 3-4). His refusal to incarcerate the text’s 
multiple virtual possibilities goes in hand with Derrida’s conception of meaning as a 
molecular element constantly displaced and postponed. Vladimir and Estragon’s world 




stuck in the waiting road; first and second act end with a time-space reversal, both in the 
same way:  
ESTRAGON: Well, shall we go?  
VLADIMIR: Yes, let’s go.  
[They do not move] (p. 51)  
A few casuistic inquiries may emerge from this – what is it, then, what keeps them 
in motion; in constant walks out of the stage, peeing, shouting and wanting to hang each 
other? Is the evidence of life’s contingency unbearable? Derrida suggests that the worst 
form of injustice is the fixed presence of the present, the life which is fully present to 
itself which therefore has no conception of death and no desire to hear it spoken of: no 
conception of what is past or what is to come (Derrida in Uhlmann, 1993, p. 278) The 
mechanics of the waiting status, however, constitute a desiring-machine organized by an 
abstract machine: the physical absence of Godot. As Deleuze and Guattari define in A 
Thousand Plateaus, the plane of immanence or the Body Without Organs is organized by 
abstract machines. Assemblages and their organizing principles are the structure of the 
virtual (2013). These do not conform to the Platonic model of thought – whereby signs 
and ideas are defined negatively in regards of the real: always not the ‘real’ thing – but 
operate without resemblance to it, organizing, and actualizing the real itself. Illustrative 
of this is the relation drawn at the first section of the paper between desiring-production 
and social production, whereby desire is not foundational of an imaginary realm – and a 
necessary deviant of the Real, as stated in Lacanian theory – but a machine that produces 
sociality and the real itself. In these lines, I would rather reformulate the ‘naturalistic’ 
questions posed at the beginning with a more rhizomatic ones concerning the operativity 
of the Godot-assemblage in producing real effects on the plane of immanence and 
articulating Vladimir and Estragon as potential nomadic subjectivities.   
As I have argued in the first section of this paper, desiring-machines are eminently 
social machines; the socius codifies and inscribe flows of desire. In this, the productivity 
of Godot’s absence is found in the schizo-flows traversing Vladimir and Estragon and 
disjointing them from the coordinates of space and time. The mechanics of the waiting 
status are productive in as much as Godot’s absence remains intact. In this way, desire is 
found to be functioning “not as a desire-lack, but as a plenitude” (Harper and Savat, 2016, 
p. 26). There are no separate realms – that is, the imaginary, the symbolic and the Real – 




the ‘characters’ dismemberment, two things happen: firstly, the notion of a fixed 
subjectivity is dissolved in favour of becoming-imperceptible – as described in the third 
sub-section of this paper –; secondly, I would argue, Godot is re-framed in the libidinal 
investments of desiring-machines, that is, not defined as a lack in meaning or a 
representational void to be filled, but as a full producer of the real itself. In so far as his 
[sic] ‘absence’ is productive, it will prompt haecceities and intensities to move and affect 
not just the ‘characters’ corporeality, but also the performance’s space-machine: the 
stage, the audience, the lightning, the sound-system, and the actors are not separate 
individualities anymore, but “already entering into new agencements” (Lehmann, 2007, 
p. 44).  
Beckett’s constellation of ‘characters’ is a radical objection to modernist dramatic 
tradition and a postulation for immanent ontology and ethics; a new mode of thought 
stripped off its old metaphysical beliefs and transcendent epistemology that can finally 
embrace the ‘unproductive’, the ‘unamendable’, the schizophrenic entities that conform 
the assemblage of our own dis-placed subjectivity.  
4.3.Desire-principle as the ultimate conjunctive synthesis 
Alan Badiou has located the vitality of Beckett’s work in his determination to 
preserve the desire-principle that keeps ‘characters’ in constant movement. He argues 
that, in the first part of Beckett’s oeuvre, his ‘characters’ are reduced to the three basic 
functions of human activity: movement and rest, being, and the imperative of language – 
or “la imposibilidad del silencio (p. 17).5 Engaging with what has been previously 
described as the ‘characters’’ vagabondage, Badiou emphasizes that their 
dismemberment – what has been theorized as an inclusive-disjunctive synthesis 
consequently producing a Body without Organs – is an instantiation of the essence of 
movement itself:  
No solamente la errancia debe ser separada poco a poco de todo sentido 
aparente, sino que, como se trata de presentar la esencia del movimiento, eso 
que en el movimiento es movimiento, Beckett va a destruir de paso todos los 
medios, todos los apoyos exteriores, todas las superficies sensibles de la 
movilidad (2007, p. 18)   
                                                          
5 I will quote the Spanish translation of Alan Badiou’s Beckett, l’increvable désire (1995), for it is the 




What he coins as “ascesis metódica” (2007, p. 17) undertakes the synthesis of all 
human functions to its irreducible functionality, which is to be found in the full collapse 
of Vladimir and Estragon’s mobility. Movement becomes, in the case of Waiting for 
Godot, externally inextricable from immobility. In contrast with Badiou’s statement that 
the almost larval ‘humanity’ of Beckettian characters conceals the real questions of 
subjectivity – such as the relation between language and being – a Deleuzoguattarian 
reading of this unproductive state of bodies would point rather to a deterritorialization of 
the logocentric socius of human activity, and thus would incorporate the larval, the static 
and exhausted elements of an ascetic humanity – in Badiou’s terms – into the very 
cartography of the Body without Organs. After the reduction of all human secondary 
qualities to the basic functions of a nearly-catatonic corporeality, what remains the motor 
of Beckettian desiring-machines is, according to Badiou: “un amor poderoso por la 
obstinación humana, por el infatigable deseo” (2007, p. 63).  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In response to schizoanalysis’ real question(s), that is: “what drives your own 
desiring-machines? What is their functioning? What are the syntheses into which they 
enter and operate?” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2009, p. 290), I would first argue that Godot 
operates as the molar strata to which the full Bodies without Organs are linked to, and 
thus is the starting point of desire production. Given that the molecular revolution cannot 
take place in segregation with the molar strata – “social struggles are molar and molecular 
at the same time” (Guattari, 2007, p. 179), Vladimir and Estragon’s waiting is ultimately 
a productive deferral of transcendent meaning in so far as they dislodge Godot’s centrality 
in their own subjectivation-machineries. In other words, if power manifests itself in the 
field of micro-cells – as Foucault argues in Discipline and Punish (1995) – and the 
molarity of power is organized, micro-dimensionally, in the form of processes of 
singularization – the ‘subject’ as we know it being one of them – the revolutionary force 
of Vladimir and Estragon’s schizo-flows is found in the failure of the Godot-machine 
itself, not outside of it. What is at stake, therefore, is not the causality of the waiting – 
being thus Godot’s arrival an end-cause of the process – but rather the lines of escape the 
waiting produces, that is: the becoming-imperceptible and becoming-molecular of the 
‘characters’ themselves. As Deleuze and Guattari put it: “there is always something that 
flows or flees, that escapes the binary organizations, the resonance apparatus, and the 




opposition interceding in Vladimir and Estragon’s processual becoming(s), for it is 
precisely from where the ‘characters’ can emerge as nomadic deviations, as molecular 
disruptions of the abstract-machine that subjects them. Their waiting becomes, being 
extricated from its linguistical transitiveness, an intransitive process of ever-new 
becoming. Just as becoming and desire “lack a subject distinct from themselves” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2013, p. 278)), Vladimir and Estragon’s waiting is pure immanent 
transformation: not a ‘waiting for’ – an absent, unattainable thing to be found outside the 
‘waiting’ – but a waiting productive in its intransitiveness.   
The functioning of the desiring-machine(s) follows an unhinged temporality – as 
seen in the scarcely perceptible transition from the first act to the second one: “Next Day. 
Same Time. Same Place” (Beckett, 1952/2010, p. 52) – and hence escapes the teleology 
of progressive action, a movement which Žukauskaitė defines as a “total distortion of 
representation” (2005, p. 5). Repetition replaces representation and difference replaces 
identity. In this light, “Beckettian laughter” (Žukauskaitė, 2005, p. 16) is directed at 
mocking the Modernist postulates of theatrical tradition that conceive the performative 
event as a ‘representation’ or ‘imitation’ of the Real. Beckettian “theatre of 
metamorphoses and permutations” (Deleuze, 2009, p. 68) leaves behind the world of 
representation and identity in favour of a becoming-virtual of performance, namely: “the 
process of actualization following the plane [the plane of immanence] that gives it its 
particular reality” (Deleuze, 2005, p. 31). The virtuality of Waiting for Godot is 
crystallized in its immanency – as Cull (2012) has argued: all theatre is immanent. The 
body of the theatrical event extends its affective possibilities across space and time, 
creating and re-creating full bodies without organs through continuous processes of 
becoming-differential. Deleuze and Guattari’s deterritorialized, anoedipal libidinal 
economy enables Cull to argue that “representation is real creation, not a second-order of 
being, forever detached from and inadequate to some ‘thing’ that is represented” (2012, 
p. 5), and thus is the triggering point for performance philosophy to embrace the 
performative potential of the Deleuzoguattarian Body without Organs:  
It is a question of making a Body without Organs upon which intensities pass, 
self and other – not in the name of a higher level of generality but by virtue 
of singularities that can no longer be said to be personal, and intensities that 
can no longer be said to be extensive. The field of immanence is not internal 




it is like the absolute Outside that knows no Selves because interior and 
exterior are equally a part of the immanence in which they have fused (2013, 
p. 182).  
Agamben’s reflection on the virtuality of Deleuze’s ellipsis dots (1996, pp. 220-
302) is central for feminist post-humanist critical schools, in that it renders all 
dichotomies unproductive constructs.  The conceptualisation of bare life – in contrast to 
‘politically qualified life’ – as well as oppositions such as zoe / bios are rendered 
impossible by Deleuze’s univocity of being and philosophy of immanence. As Agamben 
puts it:  
The plane of immanence thus functions as a principle of virtual indetermination, 
in which the vegetative and the animal, the inside and the outside and even the 
organic and the inorganic, in passing through one another, cannot be told apart 
(1996, p. 233)  
Life as immanence and immanence as a life, as theorised by Deleuze, become of central 
importance in Braidotti’s nomadic ethics and theorisation of a transpositional subject, as 
well as for contemporary performance philosophy (see Cull, 2012). In displacing the 
notion of life from the concept of ‘the human’ – which, according to Braidotti (2006) has 
been colonized by phallogocentrism – the Body without Organs becomes fundamental 
for thinking both the political ontology of the subject and the body of performance as an 
increasingly prosthetic, biocultural, and technologized art.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s molecularization of the self, as we have seen, constitutes 
a broader critique to the dominant social-political forces that operate within and produce 
the thinking-rational subject of the standard majority – understood in the 
Deleuzoguattarian anummerical sense of a standardized parameter “in relation to which 
larger quantities, as well as the smallest, can be said to be minoritarian” (2013, p. 339). 
The conceptualization of the Body without Organs’ full immanency is the point of 
departure for Rosi Braidotti’s nomadic ethics, which addresses the problematics around 
the ethical implications of a non-unitary vision of the subject and the processes involved 
in its deterritorialization. By considering the subject a product of social forces, a result of 
subjectivation-machineries, the boundaries between the singular self and society are 
blurred. Everything becomes, in fact, a machine assembled to another machine: there is 




process [of tracing a genealogy of ‘life’], political philosophy and epistemology will be 
able to maintain their present physiognomy and difference with respect to ontology” (p. 
239). In this light, the quest for delimiting a contemporary philosophy of performance is 
intimately engaged with the re-configuration of the biopolitical dichotomy between 
human/life, bios/zoe, interiority and exteriority. Beckettian virtual indeterminacy – as this 
paper has tried to configure along with a schizoanalytic reading of his ‘characters’ – 
constitute one of the starting points for a radical critique of anthropocentrism, as well as 
the triggering point for a philosophy of performance that encompasses, finally, the 
ontology of a nomadic, schizo-subject and the ethics of the theatrical event as a virtual, 
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